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1 Introduction
In 2001, the European Commission concluded that existing EU corporate tax systems
are highly ine¢ cient: they distort the international allocation of capital and create high
administrative and compliance costs. The Commission argued that these ine¢ ciencies were
partly due to the system of separate accounting, under which accounts of a multinational
subsidiary terminate at the border. The European Commission (2006) therefore proposed
to pursue with an alternative system based on consolidation with formula apportionment.
Under that regime, each multinational will identify its EU-wide consolidated prots, which
will be allocated to member states on the basis of an apportionment formula, consisting of
employment, payroll, assets, and/or sales. Each member state will tax the allocated prot
at its own tax rate. In determining the consolidated tax base, the European Commission
aims at a common denition of the tax base and one single formula. The proposal is
labelled CCCTB: the common consolidated corporate tax base.
The CCCTB is likely to produce an aggregate welfare gain for Europe, although the
size of this gain is probably modest (Fuest, 2008; van der Horst et al., 2007). Yet, not all
countries may benet. Indeed, the precise impact on welfare of a country will depend on
the choice of the apportionment formula. If some countries are worse o¤, then it will be
di¢ cult to agree upon the CCCTB among 27 Members of the EU. This is especially so in
light of unanimity voting with respect to tax matters. A potential way out is enhanced
cooperation under which a subgroup of countries in the EU coordinate their policies.
Countries that nd it not in their interest to join can decide to opt out. It is sometimes
seen as the only possible way towards harmonisation of business taxes in Europe.
This paper explores the welfare e¤ects of enhanced cooperation with respect to the
CCCTB in Europe. Economic theory o¤ers a variety of predictions with respect to en-
hanced cooperation in taxation. For instance, it suggests that countries that stay outside
an agreement will gain if tax rates are strategic complements. Moreover, countries that
are more similar are more likely to form an enhanced cooperation agreement and may
actually prefer this over global cooperation. We explore these prediction by simulating a
CCCTB reform with a computable general equilibrium model for the European economy.
The model is designed to analyse corporate tax reforms in the EU and encompasses sev-
eral decision margins of rms, such as marginal investment, nancial structure, foreign
direct investment and international prot shifting. The model is calibrated on the basis
of a careful review of the literature on behavioural elasticities and uses real world data
on economic structures for 2005. It o¤ers a valuable framework for analysing CCCTB
reforms and allows to identify the most likely winners and losers of the introduction of
the CCCTB in the EU27. We assess the welfare e¤ects of a CCCTB implemented by a
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number of enhanced cooperation agreements and put these results in the perspective of
the recent literature on enhanced cooperation agreements.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the
existing literature on consolidation and formula apportionment. Then, section 3 discusses
the literature on enhanced cooperation agreements and propose some expectations about
feasible coalitions. Section 4 o¤ers a description of our computable general equilibrium
model. In section 5, we show simulations to demonstrate the economic implications of the
CCCTB in the EU27. Section 6 analyses the CCCTB under enhanced cooperation among
alternative coalitions of countries. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Consolidation with formula apportionment
The current system of corporate income taxation (CIT) in the European Union (EU) is
based on separate accounting. It means that the accounts of a multinational enterprise
(MNE) terminate at the border and prots in each country are determined by applying
appropriate armslength prices for intracompany transactions. Under the alternative sys-
tem of consolidation, the tax base is added up to yield a single aggregate tax base for the
entire EU. In the United States and Canada as well as in the proposed CCCTB system
in the EU, the consolidated tax base is apportioned to individual countries via a formula.
In the US, States may use their own formula to determine the prots allocated. Factors
used include sales, payroll and assets. States can apply their own rate to the apportioned
part of the corporate tax base. In the EU discussion on the CCCTB, the idea is to use
one single formula to allocate prots across EU Member States.
The literature on formula apportionment concentrates primarily on the distortions
induced by the formula. The choice of the apportionment formula is important for two
reasons. First, the formula determines the distribution of the tax base across jurisdictions.
A state that is abundant in capital-intensive production facilities will receive a relatively
large share of prots if capital is used in the formula; a state with many consumers but
no production facilities will gain more if sales are used to apportion prots. Hence, each
country will have a di¤erent interest as to what apportionment factors are used. Second,
formula apportionment imposes an implicit excise tax on the apportionment factor. In-
deed, rms can inuence their corporate tax liability by locating the factors that enter the
formula in low-tax jurisdictions. As long as tax rates di¤er across jurisdictions, the alloca-
tion of investment and employment will thus be inuenced under formula apportionment.
A well-developed empirical literature explores how the variation in the apportionment for-
mulas and tax rates a¤ects investment and employment by multinationals. The majority
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of these studies are for the US. They conrm the impact of the formula on factor alloca-
tion, see e.g. Weiner (1994), Klassen and Shackelford (1998), Gupta and Hofmann (2003)
and Goolsbee and Maydew (2000). In Canada all Provinces use the same formula. As
tax rates di¤er across provinces, however, multinationals can exploit these di¤erences in
the CIT rates by reallocating factors to low-tax provinces. Mintz and Smart (2004) use
Canadian administrative tax data and nd that the elasticity of taxable income to tax
rates is signicantly higher for rms that engage in factor shifting. Also Weiner (1994) and
Klassen and Shackelford (1998) nd evidence for factor shifting to low-tax jurisdictions.
Sørensen (2000, 2004b) constructs a CGE model of tax competition in the OECD
and estimates the welfare gains from a complete CIT rate and base harmonisation in
the EU. He does not consider a sole consolidation of the tax base. The welfare gains of
harmonisation lie between 0.1 and 0.2% of GDP. While the majority of member states
gains, some countries will be worse o¤. Sørensen argues that the welfare gains might be
larger if harmonisation would succeed in considerably reducing compliance costs, which
are not included in the model.
3 Enhanced cooperation agreements
An enhanced cooperation agreement (ECA) occurs if not all countries, but a subgroup
among them agrees upon cooperation. Before discussing the literature, it is informative
to discuss the institutional characteristics of ECAs within the EU. ECAs have been in-
stitutionalized by the treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (ratied in 2003) and must
comply with a number of restrictions. First of all, the ECA can only be used when the
attempts to unify all Member States have failed, that is, it is a mechanism of last resort.
Second, a minimum of eight members states should participate in the ECA. Thirdly, the
ECA should be authorized by the European Council following a qualied majority. This
ensures that the ECA is in the interest of the majority of Member States. Fourth, the
principal of openness implies that all Member States are free to participate in the ECA
at any time if they prefer. Related to this is that the ECA should be fashioned such that
as many Member States as possible will participate. Fifth, although participation is free
and all Member States are allowed to discuss the policy enacted by the ECA, only those
Member States who participate decide upon the policy adopted. Finally, the ECA should
facilitate the European integration process and not work against its interest.
A number of papers discuss ECAs in either general settings or focussed on taxation.
Burbidge et al. (1997) adopt a simple capital tax competition model and identify three
interrelated steps in the endogenous formation of an ECA. First, a given ECA must decide
4
on (i) the common policy and (ii) how to divide the gains from cooperation via a transfer
scheme. Subsequently, given expectations on this, countries must decide which coalition
is preferred. Due to asymmetries between countries, it is found that global harmonisation
need not be the outcome of an endogenous coalition formation process. Both the common
policy, which determines the aggregate gain from cooperation, and the transfer scheme,
crucially inuence the payo¤ for each country of a particular coalition.
Beaudry et al. (2000) study whether a central authority should stimulate the creation
of an ECA. They nd that an ECA is welfare improving when spillovers within the ECA
are of the same sign as the spillovers between the ECA and the rest of the world. The
intuition is that in this case the change in policy by the ECA, which internalises within-
ECA spillovers, is to the benet of outsider countries. When the spillovers are of di¤erent
sign, the ECA is welfare improving only when the aggregate welfare improvement from
internalised spillovers outweigh the decrease in welfare in the outsider countries.
Bordignon and Brusca (2006) study whether ECAs applied to tax base harmonisation
are welfare improving. Moreover, they explore how the common policy should be decided
upon when, with some nite probability, full harmonisation is the preferred policy outcome
in the long run. They nd that ECAs are a useful in-between step when there are large
policy asymmetries between countries initially. Crucial are the assumptions that a policy
change is costly and that the gains from harmonisation are uncertain. Countries with
comparable initial policies can, by forming an ECA, reap the benets of a level playing
eld at relatively low costs. Outsider countries can join when the gains from coordination
turn out to be large. However, the choice of a common policy by the ECA might inuence
a future global standard and, therefore, both welfare and the entrance decision of outsider
countries in the future. A central planner must take this into account when forming
the ECA, an issue also studied by Alesina et al. (2005). By joining an ECA, a country
will benet from a level playing eld, but it must change its policy towards the common
ECA policy, which is costly when the initial policy reected national preferences more
accurately. Yet, the initial ECA members might be reluctant to accept the new-comer as
the benets from increasing the level-playing eld must be traded o¤ against changes in
both the common policy and the transfer scheme demanded by the new-comer. The ECA
therefore creates a status quo which inuences future developments.
Several papers have studied ECAs with respect to harmonising capital taxation. Kon-
rad and Schjelderup (1999) consider a model with symmetric countries from which a subset
decides to form a partial union. Based on the assumption of strategic complementarity
between the tax rates of the outsider countries and the union, the authors nd that the
countries involved in the partial union will unambiguously experience an increase in welfare
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after marginally increasing their joint tax rate. Interestingly, the model studied incorpo-
rates positive spillovers both within the union and between the union and the rest of the
world, which implies that, following Beaudry et al. (2000), partial harmonisation is also
in the interest of the outsider countries.
Vrijburg (2009) studies partial tax harmonisation in a model with three asymmetric
countries, which di¤er in size. With respect to the strategic behaviour of the countries,
Vrijburg studies both the case of pure Nash competition and the case where the countries
that form the partial union behave as a Stackelberg leader. He nds, in accordance with
Beaudry et al. (2000) and Konrad and Schjelderup (1999), that welfare in both the partial
union and the outsider country is increased whenever the tax rates of the outsider country
and the union are strategic complements. However, strategic complementarity cannot be
guaranteed in general. To be more specic, when two small countries form a partial union
the tax rates of the large outsider country and the union are strategic substitutes for
relative low values of the substitution elasticity between public and private goods. In this
case, partial harmonisation will increase (decrease) welfare in the outsider country and
decrease (increase) welfare in the union under Nash (Stackelberg) competition.
Another interesting nding by Vrijburg (2009) is the welfare gain from partial versus
global tax harmonisation. He distinguishes three ranges of size, where di¤erent outcomes
are optimal for harmonisation. Figure 1 presents the results for the case of Nash competi-
tion. First, if merging countries (1 and 2) are both small relative to the outsider country
(3), then forming an ECA is preferred by the merging countries compared to global har-
monisation. Intuitively, the merging countries internalise the scal spillovers between the
two countries, but they are still able to compete against the relatively large outsider coun-
try. This competition is benecial for welfare in the union as long as the countries are
su¢ ciently small. However, the outsider country would prefer global harmonisation. Sec-
ond, if di¤erent countries are more similar, then complete harmonisation is preferred over
partial harmonisation for all countries. In that case, internalising scal externalities yields
bigger gains than the opportunity to compete vis a vis the third country. As long as the
third country is not too small, it also nds it attractive to opt in the global agreement.
Finally, if the merging countries are relatively large compared to the outsider country, the
merging countries would prefer global harmonisation over partial harmonisation. However,
the outsider country will not nd it in its interest to join the ECA. Instead, while it ben-
ets from the formation of the ECA, it gains from competition as long as it is su¢ ciently
small. The result suggests that countries will more likely cooperate if they are su¢ ciently
similar. If one country is very di¤erent, then either this country will nd it desirable to opt
out or the ECA will nd it desirable to keep that country outsider the coalition. Recog-
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Figure 1: Welfare e¤ects of partial and full tax harmonisation when countries di¤er in size
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nize that in the latter case, partial harmonisation cannot be regarded as a rst step to
global harmonisation. Either the outsider country or the merging countries always prefer
partial harmonisation over global harmonisation. Only when the asymmetries are not to
pronounced, can partial harmonisation be a rst step towards global harmonisation.
Conconi et al. (2008) nd that an ECA can be optimal from a global perspective when
individual governments face commitments problems concerning the taxation of capital.
Consumers will make an ine¢ cient savings decision when they expect that the govern-
ment will raise capital taxes in the future. Cross-country mobility of capital constrains
the government from raising taxes too high and might therefore improve the savings de-
cision by consumers; it serves as a commitment mechanism for the government. An ECA
might therefore be preferred to global harmonisation as the latter completely removes the
commitment mechanism.
Hauer and Wooton (2003) study the welfare e¤ects of ECAs when countries compete
for inward FDI in the presence of location specic rents. They nd that the ECA enables
the participating countries to internalise positive cross-country spillovers from the MNE
locating within the union and to eliminate wasteful internal competition for the MNE.
This allows the countries to obtain a larger share in the location specic rents earned by
the MNE.
Riedel and Runkel (2007) consider an ECA on the CCCTB and focus on prot shifting
through transfer pricing. They nd that, in the short run when countries are unable
to change their statutory tax rates, prot shifting between the countries that introduce
formula apportionment and the rest of the world is reduced. This is because total prot
shifting between the partial union and the outsider country is a function of the di¤erence
between the statutory tax rate of the outsider country and the e¤ective tax rate in the
partial union. After the introduction of formula apportionment, MNEs will reallocate
investment towards the low-tax union country, which causes the e¤ective tax rate of the
partial union to be lower than the average pre-harmonisation statutory tax rates of the
countries that form the partial union. This decreases the incentive to shift prot out of the
partial union, a result that follows from the assumption of a convex marginal concealment
cost of transfer pricing. Gerard (2007) focuses on transfer pricing through a nancing
detour in an un-active a¢ liate in a low tax country. Contrary to Riedel and Runkel, this
waters edge characteristic does not depend on the size of tax rate di¤erentials. Therefore
prot shifting remains when tax havens are not included in the ECA. Gerard suggests that
the ECA should operate a credit system vis-à-vis the rest of the world (EU) to minimise
tax revenue losses. Becker and Fuest (2007) nd that an ECA with formula apportionment
might result in too little tax enforcement e¤ort by individual member countries as they
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have to share the gains from this e¤ort with the other members of the partial union.
Sørensen (2000, 2004a) uses his CGE model to study regional harmonisation of capital
taxation. In accordance with Konrad and Schjelderup (1999), he nds that the countries
that form an ECA will increase their level of capital taxation and that welfare for both the
ECA members and the outsider countries increases. The increased level of taxation by the
ECA members causes a capital ow towards the rest of the world. This capital outow
causes the ECA members to prefer full cooperation above enhanced cooperation, while
outsider countries are better o¤ under enhanced cooperation. The model implies that the
cost of tax competition is mainly in the form of a lower degree of income redistribution.
As a result, Sørensen (2000) nds that the welfare e¤ects from coordination are positively
correlated with the preference for redistribution. The mobility of capital between the ECA
and the rest of the world is essential. When capital is more mobile within the ECA as
compared to the rest of the world, the welfare gains from the ECA are larger. Furthermore,
those countries with initial high capital taxes gain from coordination, while initial low tax
countries might lose. Finally, net capital importers are found to experience a larger welfare
gain as the coordinated increase in taxation lowers net interest payable.
Using a more complex model, Brøchner et al. (2006) study an ECA between the 12
EMU Member states concerning harmonising corporate tax policy. The ECA policy is
either a weighted or an un-weighted average of the individual country policies. The aggre-
gate welfare gain from this ECA is found to be much smaller than under full cooperation.
Countries that are confronted with higher e¤ective tax burdens due to the ECA both
experience an increase in tax revenues and a decrease in domestic investment. From this
it follows that the losers (winners) in terms of welfare of the introduction of an ECA are
those countries that experience an increase (decrease) in tax revenues complicating the
design of compensating schemes. In addition, Brøchner et al. (2006) study a base har-
monisation. As countries with small tax bases tend to have high tax rates and vice versa,
base harmonisation might increase tax rate di¤erentials. It is therefore not at all clear
whether an improvement in the allocation of capital can be expected. Those countries
that are forced to broaden their tax base typically lose from base harmonisation following
an increase in the e¤ective tax level.
In this paper, we consider the welfare e¤ect of an ECA in the CCCTB in the EU. We
compare a selection of exogenously chosen coalitions that adopt an exogenously chosen
CCCTB reform. The results are compared to the impact of an EU-wide reform. We
consider neither an endogenous formation of a coalition nor of the CCCTB design. The
analysis will thus shed light on whether (i) feasible coalitions can be formed; (ii) how
countries that opt out are a¤ected; (iiii) countries that form an ECA can actually be
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better o¤ than under EU-wide harmonisation.
4 The model
We use the CORTAX model to assess the economic impact of harmonisation proposals.
CORTAX is an applied general equilibrium model describing the 27 countries of the Eu-
ropean Union, the US and Japan. It is designed to simulate the economic implications
of unilateral and multilateral corporate tax policies. The structure of each country is the
same and countries are linked via trade in goods and capital and via multinational rms.
We set shares to replicate aggregates from national accounts data in 2005 and data on rm
accounts in the ORBIS database. ORBIS is a comprehensive set of over 9 million compa-
nies provided by the Bureau van Dijk, based on standardized balance sheet information
of companies. Parameters in CORTAX are set also so as to replicate empirical elasticities
found in the economic literature. CORTAX is heavily inspired by the OECDTAX-model
of Sørensen (2001). An earlier version was used for European tax policy analysis in Bet-
tendorf et al. (2006, 2007) and van der Horst et al. (2007). A detailed description of the
structure and parameterisation of the model can be found in Bettendorf and van der Horst
(2008). This section presents the main features of CORTAX.
4.1 Households
Following the overlapping generations model of Diamond, households live for two periods.
One may interpret one period to cover 40 years. We express all variables in annual terms
to facilitate the interpretation in terms of national accounts data. Behaviour within each
40-year period is assumed to be constant. Households make their decisions regarding
work, consumption and saving by maximising a life-time utility function subject to an
intertemporal budget constraint. When young (i.e. the rst period), households choose to
allocate their time between leisure and work. When old (i.e. the second period) households
do not work but only consume. Young households receive after-tax wage income and lump-
sum transfers. This income at a young age is allocated over consumption and savings.
Savings are invested in a mix of bonds and stocks, which are assumed to be imperfect
substitutes and which yield di¤erent rates of return. In the second period, households are
retired. Consumption at old age is nanced by the assets saved from the rst period plus
an after-tax rate of return and by lump-sum transfers. Moreover, the older generation is
assumed to own the xed factor used by rms. Therefore, the old receive the economic
rents.
Household optimization yields expressions for labour supply, savings and the optimal
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asset portfolio. Asset returns are determined on world markets and we do not explore
residence-based taxes on capital in this paper. Therefore, saving is not a¤ected by the
policies explored here. The most important distortion is related to the consumption/leisure
choice. Labour supply behaviour in CORTAX is governed by the usual income and sub-
stitution e¤ects. Most empirical studies suggest that substitution e¤ects dominate income
e¤ects so that the uncompensated elasticity of labour supply is positive. In CORTAX, we
set for all countries the utility parameters so that we obtain an uncompensated elasticity of
labour supply of 0.19 on average (values di¤er slightly due to country variation in shares).
4.2 Firms
In CORTAX, one representative domestic rm and one representative multinational head-
quarter is located in each country. The multinational owns a subsidiary in each foreign
country. With 29 countries in CORTAX, we thus have 30 di¤erent rms operating in each
country, namely the representative domestic rm, the representative headquarter and 28
subsidiaries that are owned by the headquarters in the other countries.
Each rm maximises its value equal to the net present value of all future cash ows
 subject to the accumulation constraints and a production function. The production
function features three primary factors: labour, capital and a xed factor. Labour is
immobile across borders and wages are determined on national labour markets. Capital is
assumed to be perfectly mobile internationally so that the return to capital (after source
taxes) is given for each country on the world capital market. The xed factor is location-
specic (e.g. land) and is supplied inelastically. The income from the xed factor reects
an economic rent.
In calibrating the model of the rm, capital and labour parameters are determined
by national accounts data on labour- and capital income shares. The xed factor is 
somewhat arbitrarily set at 2.5% of value-added in each country. This value ensures that
CORTAX yields appropriate corporate tax-to-GDP ratios. Investment is determined by
the cost of capital. The responsiveness of investment depends on the substitution elasticity
between labour and capital. Most general equilibrium models adopt values between 0.5
and 1.0. We use a value of 0.7. It corresponds to an elasticity of investment to the user
cost of capital of  0.9, which is consistent with empirical estimates (Hassett and Hubbard,
2002).
To determine the size of corporate tax changes on investment, we need to assess the
impact of the corporate tax on the cost of capital. This depends on the initial corporate
tax system and is best measured by the e¤ective marginal tax rate (EMTR). Taking
these e¤ects together, we can compute tax-rate elasticities of investment in CORTAX. On
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average, the tax-rate elasticity is  0.3, i.e. a 1%-point higher corporate tax rate reduces
investment by 0.3%. It ranges from zero in Estonia to  0.6 in Spain (with a high EMTR).
Investment thus becomes more responsive to tax if the EMTR in a country is larger.
Firms nance their investment by issuing bonds and by retaining earnings (issuing new
shares is excluded in CORTAX). The optimal nancial structure depends on the di¤erence
between the after-tax cost of debt and equity. Along the lines of the trade-o¤ theory, we
include a nancial distress cost associated with high debt positions. The marginal cost
of debt nance increases in the debt share. In CORTAX, the convexity of the nancial
distress cost determines the impact of corporate taxation on a rmsnancial policy. We
set the parameters in this function so as to obtain a semi-elasticity of the debt share with
respect to the corporate tax rate between 0.2 and 0.4, which is based on recent empirical
studies (see Weichenrieder and Klautke, 2008). The convexity of the cost function implies
that the semi-elasticity falls in the corporate tax rate.
4.3 Multinationals
In maximising the value of the rm, multinationals take the sum of its headquarter and all
subsidiaries. The subsidiaries are assumed to be wholly owned by the headquarter. Rents
earned by subsidiaries accrue to the households in the parent country. In the calibration of
CORTAX, the size of the xed factor in each subsidiary is determined by data on bilateral
foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks. Given the xed factor, multinationals decide how
much capital and labour to employ in each foreign subsidiary. If a corporate tax raises
the cost of capital somewhere, this reduces the investment the multinational is willing to
invest. Thus, inward FDI in a location is governed by the e¤ective marginal tax rate.
In CORTAX, foreign subsidiaries need intermediate inputs to produce output. These
are supplied by the parent company. As there is only one homogeneous good in the
model, the arms-length price for this intermediate input is equal to the market price of
the numeraire good, i.e. equal to one. However, the parent company can charge a transfer
price for intra-company deliveries that deviates from this arms-length price. In particular,
a headquarter company has an incentive to set an articially low (high) transfer price for
supplies to subsidiaries in countries that feature a lower (higher) statutory corporate tax
rate. In this way, the multinational is able to shift prots from high to low-tax countries,
thereby reducing its overall tax liability. To ensure an interior solution, we specify a convex
cost function to capture the costs associated with manipulated transfer pricing. Hence,
prot shifting to countries with very low corporate tax rates becomes increasingly costly
at the margin. The elasticity of transfer pricing with respect to the corporate tax rate is
determined by the parameters in the cost function and is set to obtain a tax elasticity of
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transfer pricing of around  1.4 on average over all countries. The tax elasticity ranges
between  0.8 in low-tax countries and  2 in high-tax countries. To compare this to the
empirical evidence on prot shifting, we translate it into a semi-elasticity of the corporate
tax base. It requires that we multiply the tax elasticity of transfer pricing with the share of
intrarm trade (which, in CORTAX, is proportional to bilateral FDI stocks). These stocks
di¤er considerably between countries in the EU. Luxembourg stands out with a sum of the
inward and outward FDI stock of 9 times its GDP. Stocks are generally small in Central
and Eastern Europe, especially the outward stocks. They are large in some small Western
EU countries, like the Netherlands and Belgium. Together, the elasticity of the transfer
price and the size of multinationals determine the sensitivity of the total corporate tax
base for changes in the corporate tax rate. The tax-rate elasticity of the corporate tax
base has an average value of  0.23, implying that the corporate tax base shrinks by 0.23%
due to prot shifting if the corporate tax rate is increased by 1%-point. The majority of
countries feature a smaller elasticity as their multinational sector is small. For countries
where multinationals are more important, elasticities are larger. The largest elasticities
are reported for Belgium and the Netherlands which feature the largest multinational
sectors. In the Netherlands, a 1%-point higher corporate tax rate reduces the tax base via
prot shifting by 0.8%. The semi-elasticity is small in the Central and Eastern European
countries where multinationals are relatively unimportant.
4.4 Losses
In CORTAX, representative rms are equal ex-ante. Ex-post, however, rms di¤er due
to random shocks. We assume that random shocks occur in output or, equivalently, in
the value of sales. In the good outcome, the revenue from sales is larger than in the bad
outcome. In the latter case, prots become negative. Hence, ex-post there are both prot
making rms and loss making rms. Still, as rms are equal ex-ante, the possibility of
di¤erent ex-post outcomes introduces ex-ante uncertainty. We assume that rms are risk
neutral and decide on their optimal levels of investment, employment, debt shares, and
transfer prices before knowing whether they are subject to a negative shock. Hence, they
base their input decisions on expected output values and expected marginal productivities.
The probabilities of prot and loss are assumed to be independent so that shocks for a
rm are not correlated between years.
In todays corporate tax regimes in Europe, losses can be carried forward and o¤set
against future prots within the same country. It implies that losses are treated asym-
metric from prots for two reasons. First, the year at which losses can be o¤set is usually
bounded so that some losses cannot be o¤set against future prots. Second, rms can only
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carry forward nominal losses, i.e. without indexation. Due to discounting, the value of
these losses declines over time. In CORTAX, we assume that losses can be carried forward
one year. If the company makes a loss in two consecutive years, the rst-year loss dries up
and cannot be o¤set against prots in the future. Although this may underestimate the
current opportunities for loss compensation (losses can usually be carried forward more
than one year), the assumption of uncorrelated shocks tends to overestimate the amount
of losses that can be o¤set.
We use ORBIS to obtain information about the average loss probability and the aggre-
gate ratio of loss/prot in the EU. The average loss probability is around 0.2; the aggregate
ratio of loss/prot equals 14 . As the ratio of loss/prot probabilities 0.2/0.8 matches the
aggregate loss/prot ratio, the average loss in a loss-making rm is assumed to be equal
to the average prot in a prot making rm.
4.5 Government
Government behaviour in CORTAX is exogenous, Hence, the government does not opti-
mize its policies and we simply modify tax rates exogenously. In performing simulations,
we keep the government budget balanced, i.e. the government does not run a surplus or
decit after a reform. On the revenue-side of the government budget constraint, we have
indirect taxes on consumption and direct taxes on various sources of income: corporate
income, labour income, dividends, capital gains and interest. On the expenditure side of
the constraint, we nd government consumption, interest payments on public debt and
lump-sum transfers. We keep government consumption and public debt constant as a frac-
tion of GDP. The initial labour and consumption tax rates are calibrated by using e¤ective
taxes computed from Eurostat (2007). The calibration of corporate tax systems plays an
important role for the outcomes of tax reforms. These systems are calibrated on tax data
for 2005. In the baseline, corporate tax changes in 2006 and 2007 are simulated so that
reforms are considered relative to the systems in 2007. In the calibration, we modify the
tax base indicator for two countries: Estonia and Belgium. Belgium introduced in 2006
the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) system. As we include reforms up to 2007, our
baseline captures this Belgium ACE. In Estonia, the value of scal depreciation is zero as
no depreciation allowances are available. However, Estonia does not tax retained prots.
Indeed, it only levies a 22% tax rate on prot distributions. Hence, corporate prots in
Estonia go untaxed as long as they are not repatriated to the parent or distributed to
shareholders. To correct for this special feature of the Estonian tax system, we modify
its corporate tax base by assuming a positive allowance. It is set so as to replicate the
corporate-tax-to-gdp ratio for Estonia. We maintain the Estonian corporate tax rate at
14
22%.
4.6 Consolidation and formula apportionment
Consolidation of the tax base for a multinational implies summing up the tax bases of all
subsidiaries. This tax base is apportioned to the participating tax authorities according
to a prescribed formula. Each country is assigned a share ij of the tax base (where i and
j represent the home and host country, respectively), which it may tax at its own tax rate
;j . The share is calculated as a weighted average of three factors: employment, capital
stock and production:1
ij = f
LLij
Li
+ fK
Kij
Ki
+ fY
Yij
Yi
(1)
The weights of the three factors, denoted by fL;K;Y , sum up to one. The variable Lij
denotes employment by a subsidiary in source country j of a multinational from home
country i. Total employment by multinational i is thus given by Li =
P
j Lij . When
the consolidated tax base is allocated according to the labour shares, jurisdiction j thus
receives a fraction Lij=Li. The same notation applies to capital and production. One can
easily check that the shares sum to one for each multinational (
P
j ij = 1). Our starting
point is a broad formula with equal weights on employment, capital and production, i.e.
fL = fK = fY = 1=3.
The tax rate relevant for decisions by multinationals can be written as a weighted
average of the tax rates applied by the participating jurisdictions:
 fa;i =
X
j
ij ;j (2)
In the determination of optimal input demands, multinationals take into account that
they can a¤ect the -shares to minimise the overall tax rate  fa . In other words, they
can still relocate mobile factors under formula apportionment if corporate tax rates di¤er
across jurisdictions. We assume that the formula apportionment system is mandatory for
all multinationals.
1 In practice, it is di¢ cult to dene capital and to a lesser extent employment and production. This issue
is outside the scope of the current paper, see e.g. Martens-Weiner (2006). We consider production instead
of sales as a factor in the apportionment formula. In our model, we are unable to dene the destination of
sales, as only the net exports of each country are known. This prohibits the use of sales in the formula.
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4.7 Equilibrium and welfare
Equilibrium must hold on each market. On the goods market, a homogenous good is traded
on a perfectly competitive world market. Thereby, countries cannot exert market power
so that the terms of trade is xed. On asset markets, bonds and equity of di¤erent origins
are perfect substitutes and are freely traded on world markets so that returns are xed
for individual countries. Debt and equity are imperfect substitutes. The current account
equals the change in the net foreign asset position for each country (including rest of the
world), due to Walras law. As labour is immobile internationally, wages are determined
nationally on competitive labour markets. We focus on the steady state outcomes of the
model.
We compute the compensating variation to measure the welfare e¤ects of policy changes.
It is equal to the transfer that should be provided to households to maintain their utility
at the pre-reform level. A positive compensating variation implies a welfare loss. In pre-
senting the welfare e¤ects of reforms, we put a minus for the compensating variation so
that a positive value denotes an increase in welfare. We express the welfare e¤ect in terms
of GDP.
5 Analysing a CCCTB in Europe
This section analyses the introduction of a common consolidated corporate tax base (CC-
CTB) in all EU-countries (see van der Horst et al., 2007). The reform can be decomposed
into two parts. First, the introduction of a common base in Europe, implying common
rules for depreciation, investment incentives, loss treatment, etc. Second, we consider the
shift from separate accounting with transfer pricing towards consolidation with formula
apportionment.
5.1 Common base
We introduce a common base at the current EU-average. This choice of the common base
di¤ers from the proposals by the European Commission, which involve a net broaden-
ing of the corporate tax bases in Europe in combination with a reduction in corporate
tax rates (see e.g. CCCTB Working Group, 2007). In our simulations, we assume that
the EU develops a set of rules regarding tax depreciation, loss o¤set and tax incentives
which produces a tax base that is equal to the aggregate base generated by the variety
of regimes currently in place. Hence, some countries broaden their tax base while others
narrow it. The common base applies to both multinationals and domestic rms. If tax
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revenues change in a country, we assume that lump-sum transfers are used to balance the
government budget.
The simulations reveal that the aggregate welfare e¤ect of the common base for Europe
is small. On aggregate, welfare rises by a slight 0:006% of EU27-GDP. This is because there
is no aggregate change in the tax base in the EU, only a change in individual countries. The
small aggregate benet is due to a slight reduction in the variation of e¤ective marginal
tax rates across countries, which improves capital export neutrality. The more e¢ cient
allocation of capital across countries generates a small welfare gain.
For individual countries, the common base has larger e¤ects, depending on the change
in the individual countrys tax base. Figure 2 shows the welfare implications of the common
base for countries, thereby assuming that each country adjust transfers to households to
maintain revenue neutrality. Hence, countries that broaden their base are able to raise
transfers; countries that narrow their base reduce transfers. On the horizontal axis is the
initial net present value of depreciation allowances as a share of the purchase price of an
investment (which lies between 0 and 1). The gure shows that countries that narrow
their tax base by means of more generous depreciation allowances and tax incentives
experience a welfare gain. This is because the narrower tax base reduces the cost of
capital so that investment distortions decline. More investment raises the productivity
of labour and is accompanied by higher wages. This encourages labour supply so that
employment expands. The increase in investment and employment lead to a higher level
of GDP. Welfare increases up to almost 0:4% of GDP in Poland and Spain. Countries
that gain in the top-left corner of Figure 2 include also Ireland, Hungary, Malta, Austria
and Czech Republic. In contrast, countries that broaden their base via less generous
allowances for investment experience opposite e¤ects. This includes Belgium (with its
ACE system currently in place), Estonia, Lithuania, Denmark and France among others.
Figure 2 shows that welfare falls with the size of initial allowances. The biggest loss is for
Belgium that abolishes its ACE system, which substantially increases the cost of capital
(see de Mooij and Devereux (2008) for an analysis of ACE reforms in the EU).
5.2 Consolidation with formula apportionment
Next, we consider the impact of consolidation and formula apportionment. To avoid
mixing-up e¤ects of a common tax base with the e¤ects of consolidation and formula ap-
portionment, this subsection takes the common base as a starting point for the analysis.
Hence, the e¤ects of the CCCTB with consolidation and formula apportionment are as-
sessed relative to a European common corporate tax base. With CORTAX, we simulate
the shift to consolidation and formula apportionment and assume that tax rates remain
17
Figure 2: Welfare e¤ects of common base
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unchanged. If an individual country loses or gains in terms of corporate tax revenue, we
rst close the government budget by adjusting lump-sum transfers. Later, we also look
at alternative closure rules. In the simulations, we use a formula of 1/3 for employment,
assets and output. In CORTAX, the reform has both ex-ante e¤ects on corporate tax
revenue of countries and behavioural e¤ects that a¤ect economic outcomes and aggregate
welfare ex-post. The next two subsections discuss these in turn. Note that the simulations
ignore the impact of the CCCTB on compliance costs. To the extent that lower compliance
costs would yield additional welfare gains, it would increase the likelihood that countries
opt in the system.2
5.2.1 Ex-ante e¤ects
We rst present the ex-ante revenue e¤ects of consolidation and formula apportionment.
Corporate tax revenue is a¤ected by two channels. First, formula apportionment modies
the distribution of the European corporate tax base across countries as compared to the
2This e¤ect is di¢ cult to predict. Yet, compliance costs may fall for a number of reasons. For instance,
multinationals no longer have to put e¤ort in determining transfer prices for complicated transactions.
Moreover, rms can calculate a single European tax liability based on common rules instead of 27 di¤erent
ones based on very diverse national systems. This would be particularly benecial if a central administra-
tion became responsible for the tax treatment of the multinational. If tax authorities have to deal with two
di¤erent systems, one for domestic rms and one for multinationals, administrative costs for governments
may also increase. In the absence of clear-cut empirical information about how much compliance costs will
fall under the CCCTB, we ignore this issue in this paper.
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Figure 3: Ex-ante e¤ect of a switch from separate accounting (with common base) to
formula apportionment on corporate tax-to-GDP ratios
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current regime with separate accounting. Some studies have analysed these distributional
e¤ects using micro data from rm accounts (see e.g. Devereux and Loretz, 2008; Fuest
et al., 2007). In CORTAX, the estimated reallocation of the corporate tax base is de-
termined by national accounts data, which determine the shares in the formula for each
country. Figure 3 shows the e¤ects for corporate tax-to-GDP ratios of individual countries.
We see that the Netherlands and Ireland lose most revenue from formula apportionment,
around 0:4% to 0:6% of GDP. Estonia, Belgium and Portugal gain most.
Second, corporate tax revenue is inuenced by loss consolidation. In particular, under
the current system of loss carry forward, some losses can not be o¤set, either due to
limitations in the period of loss o¤set or because a subsidiary does not make future prots.
Moreover, losses are not indexed in tax systems. Thus, they need to be discounted under
loss carry forward. Under consolidation, a loss in one part of the company can be o¤set
immediately against prots elsewhere. Hence, as long as prots elsewhere in the group
are positive, losses can always be o¤set and without discounting. It means that the tax
burden for the group under loss consolidation is lower than under loss carry forward.
Assuming that all losses that occur in European subsidiaries can always be o¤set by
prots elsewhere, we have computed the expected structural reduction in the corporate
tax burden for multinationals under consolidation. Figure 4 shows the results. On average,
we nd that corporate tax revenue falls by 0:1% of GDP. It is equivalent to a reduction
of the tax burden by about 2:5% of current revenue. The reduction is higher for countries
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Figure 4: Ex-ante e¤ect of loss consolidation as compared to loss carry forward on corpo-
rate tax-to-GDP ratios
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featuring high corporate tax rates and a large multinational sector.
5.2.2 Ex-post e¤ects
Firms change their behaviour in response to consolidation and formula apportionment.
Their response depends on both the formula adopted and on how the government makes
up for the revenue loss associated with loss consolidation. This section rst assumes that
countries use lump-sum transfers to balance their budget. Later, we also consider the
reform if labour or corporate tax rates are increased to do this. The aggregate economic
e¤ects for the EU are presented in Table 1. The welfare e¤ects for individual countries
are presented in Figure 5.
The welfare e¤ects of consolidation and formula apportionment in CORTAX are caused
by three e¤ects. First, in the new regime multinationals can no longer shift prots to sub-
sidiaries within Europe. Indeed, prots are consolidated so any manipulation of transfer
prices is worthless. The abolition of prot shifting reduces corporate tax revenue in low-tax
countries and raises it in high-tax countries. Yet, it is not a zero-sum game because prot
shifting allows multinationals to reduce their overall tax burden. Taking away this oppor-
tunity raises the tax burden for rms and increases the cost of capital. This discourages
investment and hurts welfare.
A second e¤ect o¤sets the impact of reduced prot shifting. In the old regime, rms
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had an incentive to relocate capital if the e¤ective tax burden in di¤erent locations was
di¤erent. In the new regime, a multinational will have an incentive to reallocate factors to
low-tax jurisdictions as this changes the weights appearing in the apportionment formula.
With a larger weight of low-tax countries, more income is taxed at that low rate and so
the overall tax burden for the rm declines. E¤ectively, statutory corporate tax rates
become taxes on the factors that appear in the formula. As long as tax rates di¤er across
countries, rms will therefore have an incentive to reallocate inputs. In a sense, formula
apportionment replaces one distortion in capital allocation by another distortion. The
model reveals whether this improves allocatieve e¢ ciency or not.
The last e¤ect of formula apportionment is due to a lower tax burden associated with
loss consolidation. This e¤ect is subtle. First, loss consolidation reduces labour costs. This
is because wages will always directly be deducted from the multinationals´ corporate tax
bill, while this might not be the case under loss carry forward (as costs might be deductible
later if prots are made). Second, loss consolidation does not necessarily reduce the cost
of capital. On the one hand, deductible costs become more valuable under consolidation
as such costs can be deducted earlier and always. This might not be true under loss carry
forward when some costs might not or only later be deducted. On the other hand, the
marginal returns on investment are also taxed immediately and cannot be postponed or
waved in case of loss. This increases the cost of capital.
The upper row of Table 1 shows that Europe as a whole benets from consolidation
with formula apportionment if the revenue losses are compensated by a reduction in lump-
sum transfers to households. On average, welfare expands by almost 0:1% of GDP. The
main reason is that the reduction in the tax burden induced by loss consolidation (nanced
by lower lump-sum transfers) raises investment, employment and welfare.
The shift in the tax burden from distortionary corporate taxes towards lump-sum taxes
is accompanied by e¢ ciency improvements. It is a serious limitation of the model, however,
that it does not consider the e¤ects on the income distribution. Indeed, governments use
distortionary taxes for distributional reasons and the e¢ ciency costs of taxation reect
the social costs of equality. In principle, these should be balanced by the social gains from
equality. By ignoring distribution in CORTAX, one might wrongly conclude that a switch
from distortionary to non-distortionary taxes yields a social welfare gain. To avoid this, we
consider simulations in which other distortionary taxes are used to balance the government
budget. The second and third rows of Table 1 show that if higher corporate tax rates or
labour taxes are used to balance the government budget, the positive economic e¤ects are
smaller. Higher corporate tax rates are particularly harmful for investment, while higher
labour taxes especially hurt labour supply incentives and reduce employment. In these
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Table 1: CCCTB average EU e¤ects
CoC Capital Wage Employm. GDP Welfare
Transfers 0.05 0.38 0.41 0.17 0.18 0.08
Corporate tax 0.02 0.13 0.20 0.09 0.07 0.01
Labour tax 0.05 0.23 0.42 0.02 0.03 0.03
cases, the welfare e¤ect drops to only 0:01% and  0:03% of GDP, respectively.
For individual countries, Figure 5 shows the welfare e¤ect under lump-sum transfer
adjustment. The welfare e¤ect of individual countries is the net e¤ect of various opposing
forces. First, consolidation and formula apportionment causes a redistribution of the
tax base, which benets some but hurts other countries. Second, the abolition of prot
shifting implies a benet for high-tax countries and a loss for low-tax countries. Third,
this e¤ect is o¤set by distortions of the allocation formula, where low-tax countries benet
from attracting factors in the allocation formula at the expense of high-tax countries.
Finally, loss consolidation involves a shift in the tax burden from rms to lump-sum
taxation. On balance, the negative e¤ects dominate for the Netherlands and France so
that welfare in these countries drops. In all other countries, the net e¤ect is positive for
welfare. In general, Figure 5 suggests that the welfare e¤ect is related to the capital/labour
ratio in countries. Indeed, more capital-intensive countries tend to gain less from formula
apportionment than more labour-intensive countries. This is due to the formula choice,
which puts a relatively important weight on employment. As a result, the formula benets
labour-intensive countries relative to capital-intensive countries.
Figure 6 shows the welfare e¤ects of the CCCTB for individual countries if higher
labour taxes are used to o¤set the adverse revenue implications of loss consolidation. We
see that the welfare e¤ects are less favourable. Indeed, 11 of the 27 EU countries now
do not experience a welfare gain from consolidation and formula apportionment. Spain,
France and the Netherlands experience a welfare loss of more than 0.1% of GDP. Due
to the ex-ante gains from redistribution under the 1/3 formula, a number of Central and
Eastern European countries experience a welfare gain of more than 0.2% of GDP.
6 CCCTB and enhanced cooperation
The previous section suggests that a small aggregate welfare gain can be achieved by the
CCCTB in the EU. Yet, not all countries gain from the CCCTB, especially if other dis-
tortionary taxes are used to balance the government budget. If some countries lose from
the CCCTB, it raises the issue how to agree upon the proposal. Enhanced cooperation
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Figure 5: Welfare e¤ects from consolidation with equal weights, lump-sum transfer ad-
justment
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Figure 6: Welfare e¤ects of CCCTB reform, adjustment of labour taxes to balance gov-
ernment budget
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agreements might be a way out. This section analyses scenarios in which a subset of coun-
tries decides to introduce the CCCTB but others stay out. We maintain the assumption
of equal weights in the apportionment formula throughout the analysis and assume that
labour taxes are used to balance the government budget. We start from the assumption
that a common base is imposed, i.e. we do not consider the welfare e¤ects of base broad-
ening or base narrowing in individual countries. This keeps the focus on consolidation
and formula apportionment. Thereby, we concentrate on the welfare e¤ects for individual
countries, and especially the distinction between the opt-ins and the opt-outs.
Figure 7 shows the welfare e¤ects of the CCCTB for individual countries when either all
countries opt in the CCCTB regime or when 16 winning countries opt in and 11 countries
opt out as they do not benet from the CCCTB. The gure shows that the welfare loss
for countries opting out is reduced almost to zero. Hence, we do not nd that a coalition
of 16 has signicant e¤ects for the outside countries. At the same time, the welfare gains
for the opt ins fall as well. One important reason is that part of the benets for these
countries comes from redistribution of the tax base from losing to winning countries. As
it is the losing countries that drop out, this directly reduces the benets for winning
countries. When the aggregate benets of the CCCTB are small, then this process may
lead to adverse selection: once some countries start to opt out, cooperation becomes less
benecial for the remaining countries. The subsequent adverse selection might then make
any cooperation infeasible. We see, for example, that Sweden experiences a small welfare
loss when the 11 countries opt out, while it experiences a welfare gain of 0:13% of GDP
when all countries opt in. Yet, the aggregate welfare gain may imply that a feasible
coalition may remain that mutually gains from cooperation.
Next, we consider a coalition of countries that are similar in terms of the size of their
multinational sector.3 Figures 8 and 9 show the welfare e¤ects of the CCCTB when
implemented either by a coalition of countries with a small multinational sector, or by a
coalition of countries with a large multinational sector. In the gures, countries are ranked
according to the size of their multinational sector (more left is a smaller multinational
sector). The countries with a small multinational sector are primarily from Central and
Eastern Europe. The countries with a large multinational sector are located in Western
Europe and start with France in the Figures. We see that if the countries with a small
MNE sector form a coalition for the CCCTB, the economic e¤ects for these countries are
reduced. For the opt-outs, the CCCTB has a negligible e¤ect. Hence, Central and Eastern
European countries benet much less from the CCCTB if Western European countries do
not join. The reason is that Central and Eastern European countries no longer benet
3The size of a multinational sector is measured by the sum of inward and outward FDI-stocks (%GDP).
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Figure 7: Welfare e¤ects of CCCTB in winning countries
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from the inow of production factors, induced by the formula, since they feature relatively
low tax rates. Moreover, ex-ante redistribution of the corporate tax base primarily takes
place towards the Eastern European countries.
If countries with a large multinational sector adopt the CCCTB and other countries
opt out, Figure 9 shows that the benets for the opt-ins are actually bigger than under
the European-wide CCCTB. This seems counter-intuitive. Why would Western European
countries have an interest in Eastern countries not opting in? To understand this result,
we need to go back to the underlying mechanisms that drive the impact of the CCCTB.
On the one hand, the benets for the opt-ins are partly due to the tax relief induced by
loss consolidation. The welfare gains associated with this tax relief outweigh the welfare
costs induced by the higher labour tax rate. On the other hand, if all countries join the
CCCTB reform, this benet is partly o¤set by two possible negative e¤ects. The rst is
due to ex-ante reallocation of the tax base, which depends on the choice of the formula.
The second is induced by factor reallocation towards low-tax countries. Indeed, high-tax
countries su¤er from an outow of production factors by multinationals towards low-tax
countries because corporate tax rates work as excises on the formula factors. If low-tax
countries in Eastern Europe do not participate, this adverse welfare e¤ect for high-tax
countries disappears (although it is replaced by prot shifting to these countries). Hence,
enhanced cooperation among a group of Western European countries is attractive for these
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Figure 8: Welfare e¤ects of CCCTB in a coalition of economies with a small multinational
sector
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countries as compared to full harmonisation. It conrms the outcomes in Vrijburg (2009)
that, under certain circumstances, cooperating countries nd it attractive to keep other
countries outside the coalition.
The latter result is reconrmed when we form a coalition of the old EU15 member
states. Figure 10 shows the welfare e¤ects for individual countries and ranks countries
according to their capital-intensity. We nd that the CCCTB in the old EU-15 yields
slightly more favourable e¤ects for the opt-ins. The countries opting out, however, no
longer experience a welfare gain.
7 Conclusion
This paper nds that consolidation with formula apportionment in the EU will exert
a small aggregate welfare gain of approximately 0.1% of GDP. It is mainly due to the
corporate tax cut induced by loss consolidation. If corporate tax rates or labour income
taxes are used to compensate for these lower revenues, then this welfare gain almost
disappears.
For individual countries, the benets from consolidation and formula apportionment
are diverse and depend on the formula choice. Indeed, the formula determines the distri-
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Figure 9: Welfare e¤ects of CCCTB in a coalition of countries with a large multinational
sector
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Figure 10: Welfare e¤ects of the CCCTB in the EU15 (old Member States)
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bution of the corporate tax base across countries and, thereby, the revenue implications
of the reform. The formula also determines the extent to which tax rate di¤erences across
countries inuence the incentives for multinationals to relocate production factors. We nd
that a 1/3 formula for employment, assets and output will benet countries in Central
and Eastern Europe at the expense of a number of capital-intensive countries in Western
Europe. If winning countries form an enhanced cooperation agreement on consolidation,
they run the risk of adverse selection where subsequently more countries decide to opt out.
Indeed, some countries no longer benet from consolidation once losing countries opt out
of the agreement. A coalition of similar countries, in our case similar in the size of their
multinational sector, is found to more likely yield an enhanced cooperation agreement
than an EU-wide introduction of consolidation. These ndings conrm predictions in the
theoretical literature on enhanced cooperation agreements.
Our analysis is attractive to explore the opportunities for enhanced cooperation on
actual policy proposals in the EU. Yet, it also su¤ers from limitations. First, while the
allocative gains from consolidation are small, the reduction in compliance costs seems a
key issue in the debate on the CCCTB. These e¤ects are ignored in the present analy-
sis. Second, a more detailed analysis of the current rules for loss carry forward and the
implications of loss consolidation could shed a better light on this aspect of the consol-
idation proposals. Third, we have only explored one formula to allocate prots across
countries while other formulas would have di¤erent distributional and economic implica-
tions. Particularly interesting is the sales formula, which is popular in the US and also
part of the discussion in Europe. Due to lack of data, we are unable to explore consol-
idation with formula apportionment on the basis of sales by destination. Finally, most
theoretical studies on enhanced cooperation agreements explore a harmonisation of tax
rates rather than consolidation. The spillovers induced by tax rates are di¤erent than the
spillovers induced by the determination of the tax base. Indeed, with the CCCTB reforms
analysed in this paper spillovers through prot shifting are replaced by spillovers through
factor reallocation. Once tax rate harmonisation is considered, the analysis of enhanced
cooperation agreements will become more relevant due to the importance of international
spillover e¤ects.
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Appendix A Country tables
The tables in this appendix show the country-specic simulation outcomes. We present
the following variables:
 CIT-rate = absolute change in the corporate tax rate imposed on a multinational
headquarter
 Rev_CIT = absolute change in the corporate tax revenue as a share of GDP
 CoC = absolute change in the cost of capital, average across all rms
 Wage = relative change in the wage rate
 Capital = relative change in total capital stock
 Employm. = relative change in total employment
 GDP = relative change in gross domestic product
 Welfare = (-1) x compensating variation expressed in % of base GDP (i.e. positive
value reects a welfare gain)
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Table A.1: Common base (relative to Basecase)
CIT_rate Rev_tax CoC Wage Capital Employm. GDP Welfare
(a) (y) (a) (r) (r) (r) (r) (y)
AUT 0.00 0.05 0.16 0.81 2.13 0.25 0.81 0.27
BEL 0.00 0.30 0.97 4.35 11.87 1.56 4.56 1.37
DNK 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.56 1.55 0.14 0.53 0.21
FIN 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.23 0.02 0.09 0.03
FRA 0.00 0.04 0.15 0.57 1.76 0.18 0.57 0.20
DEU 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.27 0.77 0.10 0.29 0.09
GRC 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.24 0.05 0.12 0.01
IRL 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.33 0.74 0.10 0.33 0.09
ITA 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.45 0.07 0.18 0.03
LUX 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.25 0.48 0.02 0.19 0.15
NLD 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.42 1.05 0.13 0.42 0.12
PRT 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.48 0.04 0.12 0.04
ESP 0.00 0.18 0.23 1.10 2.99 0.36 1.12 0.33
SWE 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.21 0.64 0.06 0.20 0.07
GBR 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.33 0.02 0.08 0.03
CYP 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.18 0.60 0.06 0.19 0.06
CZE 0.00 0.07 0.16 0.99 2.22 0.24 0.93 0.29
EST 0.00 0.35 0.42 2.92 6.08 0.73 2.75 0.83
HUN 0.00 0.05 0.15 0.68 1.87 0.20 0.67 0.22
LVA 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.53 1.31 0.17 0.54 0.16
LTU 0.00 0.13 0.21 1.06 2.71 0.33 1.06 0.33
MLT 0.00 0.13 0.14 0.61 1.95 0.20 0.62 0.19
POL 0.00 0.11 0.22 1.11 2.85 0.38 1.15 0.36
SVK 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02
SVN 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.44 1.21 0.13 0.44 0.15
BGR 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.16 0.40 0.04 0.15 0.06
ROM 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.17 0.50 0.05 0.16 0.06
USA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
JPN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EU 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.22 0.03 0.09 0.01
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Table A.2: CCCTB with lump-sum transfers (relative to common base)
CIT_rate Rev_tax CoC Wage Capital Employm. GDP Welfare
(a) (y) (a) (r) (r) (r) (r) (y)
AUT 0.47 0.11 0.03 0.37 0.24 0.18 0.04 0.04
BEL 4.11 0.09 0.13 0.25 0.32 0.09 0.44 0.08
DNK 1.65 0.01 0.05 0.51 0.45 0.16 0.05 0.16
FIN 1.36 0.09 0.03 0.54 0.55 0.27 0.18 0.07
FRA 1.39 0.18 0.05 0.36 0.54 0.29 0.41 0.03
DEU 3.39 0.09 0.11 0.36 0.51 0.15 0.38 0.10
GRC 0.64 0.08 0.05 0.32 0.34 0.16 0.18 0.04
IRL 11.06 0.19 0.18 0.99 0.19 0.55 0.54 0.02
ITA 1.77 0.09 0.06 0.28 0.35 0.14 0.28 0.04
LUX 0.60 2.70 0.22 4.53 8.45 3.70 4.34 0.35
NLD 3.75 0.53 0.07 0.67 0.65 0.52 0.18 0.07
PRT 1.47 0.20 0.03 0.35 0.33 0.06 0.25 0.33
ESP 0.72 0.20 0.06 0.55 0.69 0.32 0.46 0.04
SWE 0.39 0.02 0.02 0.42 0.25 0.11 0.05 0.15
GBR 0.32 0.02 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.17
CYP 6.60 0.04 0.17 0.54 0.00 0.19 0.43 0.15
CZE 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.67 0.56 0.23 0.14 0.13
EST 0.62 0.26 0.00 0.37 0.10 0.10 0.32 0.30
HUN 0.33 0.21 0.01 0.67 0.22 0.15 0.33 0.27
LVA 0.20 0.07 0.00 0.28 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.09
LTU 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.25 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09
MLT 1.90 0.12 0.11 0.64 1.28 0.23 0.61 0.19
POL 0.08 0.11 0.02 0.55 0.43 0.16 0.04 0.19
SVK 0.18 0.08 0.02 0.67 1.06 0.23 0.07 0.17
SVN 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.22 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.09
BGR 0.08 0.34 0.00 0.73 0.48 0.13 0.52 0.34
ROM 0.06 0.22 0.00 0.43 0.07 0.01 0.29 0.26
USA 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
JPN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EU 0.82 0.10 0.05 0.41 0.38 0.17 0.18 0.08
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Table A.3: CCCTB with labour tax (relative to common base)
CIT_rate Rev_tax CoC Wage Capital Employm. GDP Welfare
(a) (y) (a) (r) (r) (r) (r) (y)
AUT 0.48 0.00 0.03 0.38 0.01 0.05 0.19 0.08
BEL 4.10 0.00 0.13 0.26 0.07 0.19 0.18 0.07
DNK 1.64 0.00 0.05 0.51 0.48 0.18 0.03 0.17
FIN 1.36 0.00 0.03 0.54 0.32 0.04 0.03 0.06
FRA 1.39 0.00 0.05 0.37 0.09 0.19 0.05 0.29
DEU 3.40 0.01 0.11 0.37 0.29 0.08 0.16 0.01
GRC 0.64 0.00 0.05 0.33 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.04
IRL 11.08 0.01 0.19 1.01 0.44 0.30 0.78 0.09
ITA 1.77 0.00 0.06 0.29 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.07
LUX 0.61 0.08 0.22 4.92 0.04 4.64 3.72 3.65
NLD 3.75 0.02 0.07 0.71 0.25 0.40 0.71 0.52
PRT 1.46 0.00 0.03 0.36 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.44
ESP 0.72 0.00 0.06 0.57 0.37 0.01 0.15 0.11
SWE 0.40 0.00 0.02 0.42 0.22 0.06 0.01 0.13
GBR 0.32 0.00 0.01 0.29 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.16
CYP 6.60 0.00 0.17 0.54 0.05 0.24 0.38 0.17
CZE 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.66 0.55 0.22 0.13 0.13
EST 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.45 0.29 0.03 0.46
HUN 0.33 0.00 0.01 0.66 0.66 0.60 0.10 0.51
LVA 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.19 0.21 0.02 0.15
LTU 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.24 0.17 0.16 0.01 0.13
MLT 1.90 0.01 0.11 0.64 1.12 0.06 0.45 0.11
POL 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.54 0.67 0.40 0.20 0.30
SVK 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.66 1.19 0.37 0.06 0.23
SVN 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.21 0.23 0.17 0.06 0.17
BGR 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.71 1.12 0.77 0.09 0.66
ROM 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.22 0.30 0.00 0.40
USA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
JPN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EU 0.82 0.00 0.05 0.42 0.23 0.02 0.03 0.03
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Table A.4: CCCTB with corporate tax (relative to common base)
CIT_rate Rev_tax CoC Wage Capital Employm. GDP Welfare
(a) (y) (a) (r) (r) (r) (r) (y)
AUT 0.24 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.40 0.05 0.22 0.04
BEL 14.37 0.02 0.41 1.09 0.09 0.37 1.22 0.35
DNK 2.79 0.07 0.09 0.43 0.21 0.13 0.19 0.14
FIN 2.09 0.02 0.06 0.13 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.06
FRA 0.68 0.08 0.03 0.11 0.52 0.13 0.01 0.17
DEU 2.48 0.03 0.10 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.18 0.04
GRC 0.17 0.03 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.01
IRL 10.50 0.02 0.18 0.05 1.55 0.22 1.16 0.20
ITA 0.57 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.00
LUX 2.38 2.81 0.10 1.30 5.95 3.70 2.82 2.42
NLD 4.31 0.25 0.09 0.67 1.49 0.09 0.81 0.47
PRT 1.96 0.18 0.04 0.66 0.12 0.01 0.19 0.45
ESP 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.27 0.15 0.08 0.15
SWE 0.73 0.03 0.01 0.30 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.13
GBR 1.48 0.02 0.00 0.26 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.19
CYP 7.27 0.11 0.18 0.42 0.31 0.14 0.55 0.13
CZE 0.85 0.04 0.00 0.43 0.13 0.17 0.04 0.07
EST 0.94 0.31 0.01 1.22 0.81 0.16 0.45 0.49
HUN 1.04 0.23 0.01 0.58 0.02 0.12 0.37 0.24
LVA 0.43 0.10 0.00 0.27 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.10
LTU 0.17 0.09 0.00 0.26 0.03 0.07 0.15 0.09
MLT 1.49 0.11 0.08 0.56 1.23 0.23 0.57 0.12
POL 0.69 0.13 0.01 0.45 0.22 0.12 0.09 0.17
SVK 0.65 0.12 0.01 0.65 0.99 0.22 0.17 0.17
SVN 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.24 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.10
BGR 0.04 0.38 0.00 0.85 0.56 0.15 0.59 0.39
ROM 0.33 0.24 0.01 0.56 0.01 0.04 0.30 0.31
USA 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00
JPN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EU 0.35 0.02 0.02 0.20 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.01
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Table A.5: CCCTB of winning countries with labour tax (relative to common base)
CIT_rate Rev_tax CoC Wage Capital Employm. GDP Welfare
(a) (y) (a) (r) (r) (r) (r) (y)
AUT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
BEL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
DNK 0.19 0.00 0.01 0.27 0.24 0.03 0.05 0.00
FIN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03
FRA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
DEU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
GRC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
IRL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
ITA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LUX 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.04
NLD 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03
PRT 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.04
ESP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
SWE 1.77 0.00 0.05 0.20 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.04
GBR 0.95 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.00
CYP 5.54 0.00 0.14 0.26 0.08 0.06 0.18 0.05
CZE 0.16 0.01 0.04 0.32 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.00
EST 0.69 0.00 0.01 0.19 0.26 0.13 0.02 0.22
HUN 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.19 0.16 0.05 0.01 0.05
LVA 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.05
LTU 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.05
MLT 1.89 0.00 0.10 0.36 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.05
POL 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.24 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.03
SVK 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.23 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.04
SVN 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02
BGR 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.22 0.09 0.02 0.07
ROM 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
USA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
JPN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EU 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00
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Table A.6: CCCTB of closed economies with labour tax (relative to common base)
CIT_rate Rev_tax CoC Wage Capital Employm. GDP Welfare
(a) (y) (a) (r) (r) (r) (r) (y)
AUT 0.78 0.00 0.04 0.32 0.03 0.10 0.22 0.10
BEL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02
DNK 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
FIN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
FRA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02
DEU 2.56 0.00 0.09 0.31 0.16 0.10 0.05 0.03
GRC 0.60 0.00 0.05 0.31 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.04
IRL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
ITA 1.26 0.00 0.05 0.27 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.07
LUX 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.38 0.39 0.34 0.28
NLD 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.07
PRT 1.54 0.00 0.03 0.26 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.24
ESP 0.56 0.01 0.05 0.41 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.07
SWE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
GBR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
CYP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03
CZE 0.13 0.00 0.04 0.49 0.33 0.08 0.00 0.02
EST 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.04
HUN 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.45 0.42 0.34 0.03 0.26
LVA 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.01 0.05
LTU 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.04
MLT 1.89 0.00 0.10 0.53 0.73 0.01 0.26 0.05
POL 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.35 0.35 0.15 0.04 0.09
SVK 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.52 0.88 0.25 0.00 0.13
SVN 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.15 0.10 0.02 0.08
BGR 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.79 0.46 0.02 0.36
ROM 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.17 0.17 0.03 0.20
USA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
JPN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EU 0.64 0.00 0.03 0.21 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.02
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Table A.7: CCCTB of open economies with labour tax (relative to common base)
CIT_rate Rev_tax CoC Wage Capital Employm. GDP Welfare
(a) (y) (a) (r) (r) (r) (r) (y)
AUT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
BEL 3.94 0.00 0.12 0.16 0.09 0.09 0.28 0.12
DNK 1.46 0.00 0.05 0.42 0.37 0.19 0.04 0.24
FIN 0.86 0.00 0.01 0.50 0.35 0.10 0.05 0.01
FRA 1.16 0.00 0.04 0.29 0.12 0.10 0.04 0.12
DEU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00
GRC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
IRL 10.56 0.01 0.17 1.02 0.40 0.34 0.62 0.05
ITA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
LUX 2.76 0.05 0.40 4.04 0.58 3.26 2.63 3.61
NLD 2.56 0.01 0.04 0.56 0.05 0.18 0.38 0.46
PRT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
ESP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
SWE 0.54 0.00 0.02 0.35 0.27 0.13 0.13 0.23
GBR 0.40 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.18
CYP 4.39 0.00 0.11 0.36 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.13
CZE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
EST 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
HUN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
LVA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
LTU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MLT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01
POL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
SVK 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00
SVN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
BGR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
ROM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
USA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
JPN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EU 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01
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Table A.8: CCCTB of EU15 with labour tax (relative to common base)
CIT_rate Rev_tax CoC Wage Capital Employm. GDP Welfare
(a) (y) (a) (r) (r) (r) (r) (y)
AUT 2.06 0.00 0.02 0.44 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.03
BEL 3.50 0.00 0.11 0.27 0.07 0.10 0.23 0.00
DNK 2.37 0.00 0.08 0.56 0.52 0.26 0.02 0.27
FIN 2.02 0.00 0.06 0.58 0.36 0.13 0.04 0.02
FRA 0.67 0.00 0.02 0.38 0.06 0.12 0.01 0.24
DEU 2.06 0.01 0.08 0.39 0.29 0.00 0.21 0.05
GRC 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.35 0.15 0.05 0.03 0.01
IRL 11.27 0.01 0.19 1.09 0.49 0.35 0.75 0.02
ITA 0.95 0.00 0.04 0.30 0.12 0.03 0.09 0.02
LUX 1.76 0.07 0.15 4.89 0.45 4.14 3.29 3.73
NLD 4.91 0.02 0.10 0.75 0.20 0.27 0.62 0.49
PRT 1.56 0.00 0.03 0.39 0.17 0.15 0.04 0.49
ESP 0.47 0.00 0.05 0.58 0.34 0.03 0.15 0.07
SWE 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.26 0.17 0.10 0.24
GBR 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.21
CYP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.03
CZE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01
EST 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.01
HUN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01
LVA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00
LTU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
MLT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.03
POL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00
SVK 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01
SVN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01
BGR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.00
ROM 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01
USA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00
JPN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EU 0.22 0.00 0.03 0.33 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.02
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